With preferential elections, not only the first choice of the voters may influence the result. When a candidate cannot hope to be the first choice of a voter group, it may still be worth an effort to obtain a high ranking from the group through campaigning and building alliances. The link between a candidate or party and the voters is fundamentally different in preferential elections and in elections where voters may support only one alternative, because the incentives for political behaviour are different. But the incentive to campaign for second and third ranks from politically adjacent voter groups is based on the assumption that voters will express their sincere preference in their ballots. However, depending on profile and election method, voters may have counter-incentives to vote strategically. According to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973 , Satterthwaite 1975 , one cannot get rid of the possibility of strategic voting in elections, but the theorem is based on a very broad definition of strategic voting. Some kinds of strategic voting should be regarded as less destructive than others. Arguably, one of them may even sometimes be regarded as useful. An election method should be assessed according to the incentives it gives to the most destructive kinds. How may such incentives be avoided?
Notation In a preferential election voter i (i = 1, 2, ..., v) expresses in the ballot an ordinal preference as a binary relation R i defined in the set of candidates; the social preference is R = R(R 1 , R 2 , ... , R v ). 1 Associated to R are the relations P (strict preference) and I (indifference): X P Y means (X R Y and not Y R X), X I Y means (X R Y and Y R X), and similarly for the ballot preferences R i . Here R i is supposed to be a complete ordering, i.e. a ranking with equal preference allowed, but equality is handled by means of symmetrization.
1. Voter preferences R i extend from the set of candidates C to the set of possible social preference relations R over C: voter i in a single-seat election prefers R to R* if XR i Y, where X and Y are winners in R and R* respectively. If (R (R 1 ', R 2 , ..., R v )) R 1 (R (R 1 , R 2 , ..., R v )), voter 1 may vote strategically R 1 ' instead of R 1 . The preference relation R 1 is thus better represented by R 1 ' than by itself.
A ballot relation ABC(DEF), which in Hill's notation (Hill 2001) means a shared 4.-6. rank (AP i BP i CP i D I i E I i F) is then counted as the 3! compatible ballots with linear orderings, each ballot of weight 1/6: i.e. ABCDEF, ABCDFE, ABCFDE, ABCFED, ABCEFD, ABCEDF. A practical way to include incomplete ballots is to count ABC as ABC(DEF), etc.
Why preferential elections?
Elections give people opportunities to express a sincere ideal opinion or to vote instrumentally in order to really influence a social preference relation, but this choice between idealism or realism may be an unpleasant dilemma. Plurality elections, which are commonly used for single-seat constituencies in UK and USA, are often criticized for making voting more unpleasant than it has to be. The predicament of Nader's supporters in the US presidential election 2000 has received much attention: should they vote for Nader or for a major candidate?
To some extent preferential elections make it possible for a voter to express first preference for a minor candidate, and also give real support the most acceptable major candidate.
However, hard decisions cannot always be avoided. In the didactic words of The Jenkins Commission (1998), "In many situations of life a decision has to be made in favour of a second or third best choice and there is no inherent reason why what has often to be applied to jobs, houses, even husbands and wives should be regarded as illegitimate when it comes to voting".
Pressure, as experienced by the Nader supporters, to vote for a major candidate, is generally considered as the main explanation for "Duverger's law", i.e. that plurality elections favor a two-party system. It is a matter of political science discussion (e.g. Cox 1997) how strong this effect actually is, and a matter of opinion if it is in society's best interest. When subsequent ranks are allowed to influence the outcome of an election, another incentive is created for parties and candidates: Gore's campaign organizers might have negotiated with Nader's organization for subsidiary support rather than complain that Nader voters threw the election to Bush.
To the extent that politically adjacent voter groups approach each other for subsidiary support rather than attack each other for de facto causing the opposite side to win, the driving force behind Duverger's law is reduced. However, the consequence for the seat distribution is not the only issue. 2 The political seat distribution will depend on the particular election method, but small voter groups may obtain considerable political influence because of the value their subsidiary support has for the major candidates. Preferential elections are therefore likely to influence the political climate and landscape in a very different way than both plurality elections and other elections where a voter supports just one party or candidate (Reilly 2002a) . Such influence may well be regarded as the main justification for preferential elections, but it will be reduced if the election method gives incentives for a voter not to rank the candidates sincerely.
Strategic voting
In the fora where preferential election methods are discussed, much attention is devoted to three types of strategic voting. They are all built on violations of the IIA-axiom (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives): candidate X may pass candidate Y in the social ranking without passing Y in any ballot ranking. In a 3-candidate single seat election they work as follows:
Strategy 1) Some voters switch their ranking from ABC to BAC so B can win instead of C.
Strategy 2) Some voters switch their ranking from ABC to ACB so A can win instead of B.
Strategy 3) Some voters switch their ranking from ABC to BAC so A can win instead of C.
The strategies are popularly called, respectively, "compromising", "burying", and "push-over".
Other switches may also be strategic options, for certain election methods and given certain profiles. Saari (2003) discusses the most common preferential election methods and describes all the switches a voter may do away from a "sincere" ranking ABC and thereby conceivably 2. To secure representation for e.g. ethnical minority groups in an assembly without distorting its political composition, the full electorate may choose among minority candidates for a number of reserved positions, as it is done in Indian elections (Pande 2003) . A similar idea may be implemented in STV-elections (Stensholt 2004) ; if the rules and results for the first seats imply that only some of the candidates (e.g. women) are eligible for the last seats; the remaining voting weight attached to each ballot then gives an advantage to a voter group that still is politically under-represented.
improve the outcome according to the sincere ranking. X I Y before means X R Y afterwards, X P Y before means X P Y afterwards.
Monotonic elections avoid strategy 3.
Profiles that allow strategy 2 are common in positional election methods like the Borda Count, and also in Condorcet methods. It is likely that some voter groups will attempt strategy 2. Unlike the violation of IIA exploited in strategy 3, the violation behind strategy 2 is not not necessarily unreasonable, because a switch from ABC to ACB might also be caused by a sincere change in some voters' assessment of the merit gap between A and B. However, the switch may also be an act of cunning, and incentives to attempt strategy 2 undermine the intended effect of preferential voting on the political climate.
Respect for ballot rankings We will say that a preferential election respects ballot rankings if it has the following property: A candidate, X, after a permutation in one ballot of the candidates ranked under X in that ballot, without any other changes in any ballot ranking, does equally well in relation to any other candidate, i.e. for any other candidate Y, Y P X, X I Y, or X P Y before the permutation remains Y P X, X I Y, or X P Y afterwards 3 .
Elections that respect ballot rankings avoid strategy 2.
Plurality voting is frequently and unfairly criticized for its obvious urge to apply strategy 1 4 .
The underlying violation of IIA is in itself quite reasonable. When voters switch from ABC to BAC because B is considered more likely than A to defeat C, this cannot in any way be seen as an undemocratic act of cunning. A BAC-vote in recognition of B's ability to unite a large voter group is "insincere" only in a technical sense. But if an ABC-ballot gives B the same advantage over C as a BAC-ballot does, preferential voting may have the intended beneficial influence on the political climate. Political cooperation between A and B will then be encouraged with gentler means than a pressure to use strategy 1, which means to sacrifice A in order to avoid C.
For a preferential election method to be proof against strategy 1, it suffices that it has the following property, symmetric to respect for ballot rankings: A candidate, X, after a permutation in a single ballot of the candidates ranked before X in that ballot, does equally well in relation to any other candidate, i.e. for any other candidate Y, Y P X, X I Y, or X P Y before the permutation remains Y P X, X I Y, or X P Y afterwards.
Elections with this property avoid strategy 3 as well. The property does not imply monotonicity, since it does not rule out that switching from ABC to BAC could let A win instead of B. Respect for ballot rankings and its symmetric companion together would imply IIA. Because of Arrow's 3. The phrases "later-no-harm/later-no-help" introduced by Woodall (1996) with a different but similar meaning, have also been used in the same meaning as "respect for ballot rankings". 4. As one might expect, strategy 1 is common in plurality elections with a close contest between two major candidates; a study of British parliamentary elections is found in Alvarez et al (2001) impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963) that combination of axioms is not realistic.
However, a good impossibility result is delicate. Arrow's IIA may be seen as a defence against unwanted strategic voting; IIA is then an overkill, but for an overkill, it is not extreme. Two essential parts of IIA, respect for ballot rankings and no strategy 3, are satisfied by plurality voting. If the axiomatic method is properly applied, then, in the words of Sen (1999a) , "It is therefore to be expected that constructive paths in social choice theory derived from axiomatic reasoning, would tend to be paved on one side by impossibility results (opposite to the side of multiple possibilities)". Below we explore the possibility of having elections that, like plurality elections, sustain the two axioms, respect for ballot rankings and monotonicity, but also exert less pressure on voters to attempt strategy 1 than the plurality method does.
Strategy types and their impact on elections
Three strategies are discussed. Preferential elections may be seen as ways to reduce the need for strategy 1 which is the only available voting strategy in plurality elections. An incentive to apply strategy 2, which under some circumstances may award voters for giving bottom rank to their sincere second choice, is a particularly unfortunate property of many preferential election methods. The very much unwanted strategy 3 is in itself much more unreasonable than strategy 2, and although it is not a practical tool for voters in any election method, its theoretic possibility in a family of election methods causes criticism.
Strategy 1
A plurality election is an extreme case of preferential election, where only first places count.
Plurality elections give strong incentives to apply strategy 1.
Example 1 Consider e.g. a 3-candidate profile in the set {Bush, Gore, Nader} that was estimated from opinion polls taken before the US presidential election 2000. Standardized to
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(|BGN|, |BNG|, |NBG|, |NGB|, |GNB|, |GBN|) = (424, 22, 33, 100, 40, 381) , where |XYZ| voters rank XYZ 5 . A spatial model fits this profile well: each candidate is assigned an ideal point and voters are uniformly distributed in a disc, ranking the candidate set {B, G, N} according to distance. However, the pictogram of figure 1 (Stensholt 1996 ) is exact and unique up to rotations and reflections. It uses three non-concurrent chords; the smaller triangle that these chords form, the better the spatial model approximates the pictogram. The point difference between the candidates ranked r and r+1 is then 1/r(r+1). The ordering ABCD may be expressed as a weighted sum of the matrices of example 3:
the first, second, and third component gives the appropriate advantage P 1 -P 2 , P 2 -P 3 , P 3 -P 4 points, respectively, to {A} over {B, C, D}, {A, B} over {C,D}, and {A, B, C} over {D}. 9 There The incentive to carry on the mutually destructive strategy 2 described in example 2 is clear in the Borda Count and in other positional methods. In the Nauru method of example 4, the point difference 1/r(r+1) between ranks r and r+1 decreases with increasing r. Thus the incentive for strategy 2 may be weaker and the incentive for strategy 1 stronger than in the Borda Count. 10
Remark on matrix elections Condorcet's principle of pairwise comparisons can always be applied to the Dodgson matrix, so that X R Y whenever m xy m yx . For any positional system, the ballot matrices may be chosen as in example 4, i.e. a weighted sum of approval voting ballots as shown in example 3. Then there will not be cycles. It is enough to check that a 3-cycle A R B R C R A with at least one P cannot occur in approval voting. Letting |(AB)C| denote the 9. Only the differences between row sums count in a Borda type tally, but if one likes to see row sums 1, 1/2, 1/3, and 1/4 in a ballot, it suffices to add -2 to the diagonal entries of the right hand integer matrix. 10. In the annual Eurovision Song Contest, the national votes are counted in a positional method, with 12, 10, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4 , 3, 2, 1 points for the ten best, but a national ballot is itself determined by the viewers' votes, and a participating viewer supports just one song. Thus strategy 2 is avoided. The Eurovision method is indirect, like the US presidential election, but a nation's Eurovision ballot is not similar to the seat distribution of a state in the Electoral College. number of voters with preference (AB)C etc, A R B, B R C, C R A mean
respectively. If one or more of the three Rs were a P then there would be one or more strict inequalities, and summation would yield a contradiction.
With sincere voting from a large number of independent voters, the probability that a profile with a Condorcet cycle will occur, is very small (Gehrlein 2002), but profiles that allow strategy 2 in a Condorcet method are common. Strategy 2 then involves creating a Condorcet cycle. 11
Example 5 The three profiles in figure 2 illustrate the vulnerability of all Condorcet methods to strategy 2. The profiles are, respectively, (|ABC|, |ACB|, |CAB|, |CBA|, |BCA|, |BAC|) = (10, 24, 22, 11, 19, 14) , (20, 14, 22, 11, 10, 23) , (20, 14, 11, 22, 19, 14) . The point is that number 2 in the Condorcet rankings above may create the same cyclic profile, shown in figure 3 , (20, 14, 22, 11, 19, 14) :
11. However, as long as ballot matrices are weighted sums of approval matrices (example 3), the voters may even have freedom to express preference intensities without creating cycles in a Condorcet tally. As in Example 5, every Condorcet cycle may come from successful strategic voting for A, B, or C, starting from a suitable non-cyclic profile. As long as the Condorcet winner has less than 50% of the top ranks, the supporters of number 2 in the Condorcet ranking can always create a Condorcet cycle.
A 3-candidate Condorcet method is determined by the extension rule that picks the winner in a cycle. The discussion groups for Condorcet methods focus on what cycle-break rules that are most reasonable, given the deplorable fact that no matter how the rule is defined, the winner must lose some pairwise contest. However, it is known that different Condorcet extensions also differ in the probability that a profile which allows strategy 2, will occur. Consider the 3-candidate Condorcet method defined by the following cycle-break rule:
The winner is the candidate who defeats the plurality winner.
Theorem 1:
This rule minimizes the number of non-cyclic profiles that allow strategy 2.
Proof: Let (|ABC|, |ACB|, |CAB|, |CBA|, |BCA|, |BAC|) = with 12. In a cyclic profile pictogram the chord triangle T covers the center; to achieve this, the strategy usually creates a large T. In figure 3 T covers =.0065 of the disc. Pictograms with such a large T hardly occur in real elections with many independent voters. But all pictograms of figure 2 are quite realistic: strategy 2 in a Condorcet method does not require any rare profile property. Now are the numbers of top-ranks for the candidate defeated by, respectively, A, B, C. When the cycle-break win is awarded to the candidate who defeats the plurality winner in a pairwise contest, the number of noncyclic profiles that allow strategy 2 is minimized.
The rule of theorem 1 makes C win in the profile of figure 3 by defeating the plurality winner A. Similarly, awarding the cycle-break win to the candidate who directly defeats the plurality loser will maximize the number of non-cyclic profiles where successful strategy 2 is possible.
For n-candidate elections, n>3, there must be a rule for how to split up a "Smith set" of more than 3 candidates, i.e. the smallest set of candidates that beat all candidates outside the set in pairwise contests. One way is to tally the candidate triples using the cycle-break rule of theorem 1, and rank the candidates according to the number of triples they win.
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In matrix elections, the social relation R is a function of the Dodgson matrix M. The most common elections in the STV-family avoid strategy 2, but unfortunately they open for strategy 3 in certain profiles.
Strategy 3
The basic idea behind the STV methods is to tally the ballots in several rounds; each round ends with a candidate being eliminated or elected. In order to be elected a candidate must get enough support in terms of top-ranks. If no candidate gets elected, one candidate is eliminated. For the development of STV-ideas, see (Tideman, 1995) .
In the most thematic STV methods, the criterion for elimination is also exclusively based on the top-ranks (Stensholt 2004) . In any round, the only information available to the tally process is then the current top-rank in each ballot; only when the currently top-ranked candidate in a ballot 13 . Nanson originally eliminated all candidates with less than average Borda sum at the same time; Baldwin's later modification eliminates only the candidate with lowest Borda sum before recalculation. In both procedures at least one candidate in the Smith set will escape from elimination, as shown e.g. in Stensholt (2004, p 419) .
is eliminated or elected, is the ballot's support transferred to its second-ranked candidate.
When used in multi-seat constituencies, each ballot counts with a certain weight (voting power) which is reduced every time the ballot contributes to the election of a candidate. A suitable weight reduction gives a reasonably proportional representation of various voter groups, to the extent that the profile reflects the group interests.
By letting the tally process ignore the ranks k+1, k+2, ..., n in an original ballot as long as any of the first k candidates remain in the race, the commonly used STV versions make strategy 2 (|ABC|, |ACB|, |CAB|, |CBA|, |BCA|, |BAC|) = (11, 30, 16, 14, 21, 8) .
Let t of the 11 ABC-preferrers be assigned to vote strategically BAC. A's party must choose t>1 in order to eliminate C and t<7 in order to win against B in round 2.
In the right hand profile, (|ABC|, |ACB|, |CAB|, |CBA|, |BCA|, |BAC|) = (2, 43, 15, 16, 22, 2), there are not enough ABC-voters available for strategy 3, but some of the 43 ACB-voters may also vote BAC. Let ACB BAC mean a transfer of some votes from ACB to BAC, etc., and decompose it as ACB ABC BAC. Since strategy 2 is impossible, the first component has no effect. As an IRV-strategy for A, ACB BAC is therefore also labelled as strategy 3, extending the definition of section 1.2. In the second profile 8 or 9 A-preferrers must vote BAC. The right hand profile is nearly single-peaked, as only 4 voters rank C last.
Strategy 3 is very risky, particularly for the ACB-preferrers; if too many of them vote BAC, they make B win instead of C. In real 3-candidate elections with a large number of independent voters, profiles which allow strategy 3 in IRV are likely to occur more often than profiles with a Condorcet cycle. However, strategy 2 in a Condorcet method does not depend on a random occurrence of a cycle; it requires a profile where no candidate has 50% of the top ranks, i.e.
where a cycle can be created. A candidate who expects to be second in a Condorcet ranking, then has a clear incentive to attempt strategy 2 in many Condorcet methods.
Other voting strategies
In multi-seat STV many kinds of "free ride" may occur (Schulze, 2004) . Entering or withdrawing a candidate in an election may have significant effect on the result. In plurality elections it is clearly disadvantageous to enter two politically similar candidates, popularly called "clones". By splitting the votes, a clone may throw the election to the opposite side. However, in the Borda Count it is advantageous to enter a clone: If the A-party enters the clone A', and r and r' AB-preferrers vote AA'B and A'AB, then they give A and A' respectively r and r' extra points compared to B. Even if there should also be r+r' BA-preferrers, it is unlikely that both of these advantages will be neutralized by the BA'A-and the BAA'-votes; thus either A or A' gets an advantage over B 14 .
14. Usually a "clone" of candidate A means a candidate A' ranked immediately after A in all ballots. Then entering A' as a candidate gives A maximal advantage, but also cloning in the sense used here will, with high probability, be a disadvantage to B.
The usual election model assumes a fixed voter set and a fixed candidate set. Both the no-show and the cloning effect violate that assumption. Most election methods one cares to study are homogeneous, in the sense that the social preference depends on the relative profile. With restriction to homogeneous methods it is meaningful to discuss the no-show effect axiomatically. However, in order to discuss the cloning effect in an axiomatic setting, one shold axiomatically link together election models for different numbers of candidates.
Elections that are proof to strategies 2 and 3
How can an n-candidate preferential election with n 3 candidates give a complete and transitive social relation R and combine monotonicity with respect for ballot rankings? In the analysis below, the two symmetry conditions, neutrality and anonymity, are also assumed.
Anonymity means that if two voters switch ballots, the social preference R remains the same;
R is then determined by the number of ballots in each of the n! linear ranking categories. Neutrality means that if two candidates are switched in all ballot preferences R i , they are switched in the social preference R.
Possibilities and impossibilities in 3-candidate elections
Consider profiles with 3-candidates, A, B, and C, and voters who have linear preference relations. Standardize so that |ABC| + |ACB| + |CAB| + |CBA| + |BCA| + |BAC| = 1.
Lemma 1 Assume a 3-candidate election method gives a reflexive, complete and transitive social relation R and is anonymous, neutral, monotonic, and respects ballot rankings. If the plurality ranking is BCA, then B R A, i.e. A cannot strictly beat B in relation R.
Proof: Assume A P B, i.e. that A strictly beats B. The sequence of profile transformations in 6 from BCA to CBA cannot help B (monotonicity), in 6 neutrality implies C I A ; 6 7 between ABC and ACB cannot harm or help A (respect for ballot rankings); 7 8 between CAB and CBA cannot harm or help C (respect for ballot rankings), and C I A together with C P B imply A P B.
The conclusion C I A P B in profile 8 violates neutrality. 1/6 1/6 C I A P B 7 1/6 1/6 q 2 p 1 1/6 1/6 C I A P B 8 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
The possibility of having another winner than the plurality winner appears from the next result.
Let the plurality scores of A, B, C, respectively, be α = p+q, β = t+u, γ = r+s Also define δ = q+γ; thus δ > 1/2 when C beats B in Condorcet's sense. Clearly
Theorem 2 Assume that an election method for 3 candidates A, B, and C gives a reflexive, complete and transitive social relation, that it is anonymous, neutral, and monotonic, and that it respects ballot rankings. Assume the plurality ranking is BCA, i.e. β γ α. Then, (i) if γ 1/3 or δ 1/2, then B must win (alone or jointly);
(ii) if γ 1/3 and δ 1/2, then B or C must win (alone or jointly).
Proof: The lemma states that B R A. Hence A cannot win alone. Thus it suffices to show statement (i). If B does not win alone or jointly, then C P B R A. Consider a sequence of transfers starting from profile 0.
There are two cases, δ = q+r+s < 1/2 in Table 2 and γ = r+s < 1/3 in Table 3 . They overlap, but are treated independently. 
But the last transformation may also be done by transposition of B and C in all ballots, and so by neutrality B P C in profile 11. The contradiction proves the first case. Two transfers are made so that A passes C in terms of top-ranks, while B remains plurality winner. Since r+s < t+u = s+u 1 , u 1 > r. 00 09 is as above.
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12 from BAC to ABC cannot help B (monotonicity).
In profile 12, |BCA|+|BAC| > 1/3 = |ABC|+|ACB| > |CAB|+|CBA|. C P B contradicts lemma 1, and proves the second case.
Lemma 2 Assume that an election method for 3 candidates gives a reflexive, complete and transitive social relation R, that it is anonymous, neutral, and monotonic, and that it respects ballot rankings. If the election also does not allow strategy 1 in any profile, then only a Condorcet winner can win the election alone.
Proof: Respect for ballot rankings and monotonicity means that also strategies 2 and 3 are ruled out. Consider an election with candidates X, Y, and Z, where strategies 1, 2, and 3 are impossible. Assume Z P Y and Z P X, without Z being Condorcet winner. Assume, for contradiction, that X be at least equal to Z in the pairwise Condorcet comparison:
Those who prefer X to Z may transfer votes between the categories XZY and XYZ and between the categories XYZ and YXZ to obtain The first kind of transfer cannot upset the result Z P X (respect for ballot rankings). The second kind cannot upset it because strategies 1 and 3 are not available. A final transfer from YXZ to YZX switches |YXZ| and |YZX|, and cannot help X because of monotonicity. Thus we still have Z P X. However, the final switch of profiles may also be done by switching X and Z in all ballots, and neutrality implies X P Z in the last profile.
Theorem 3 Assume that an election method for 3 candidates gives a reflexive, complete and transitive social relation, that it is anonymous, neutral, and monotonic, and that it respects ballot rankings. If strategy 1 is unavailable in all profiles, the method fails to give a single winner whenever the Condorcet winner is also the plurality loser.
Proof: By Lemma 1, a plurality loser can never win the election alone. By Lemma 2, only a
Condorcet winner can do it.
A single seat election method is too indecisive for practical use if it fails to produce a winner whenever the Condorcet winner also happens to be the plurality loser. In all elections considered here, the social relation R is defined by means of a finite number of inequalities; in a 3-candidate election they may be written with a finite number of linear expressions L i :
. At most, one should tolerate indecisiveness as a consequence of equalities, i.e. at a "thin" set in the profile space. Thus, to achieve respect for ballot rankings and monotonicity, we must accept that some profiles will allow strategy 1.
Theorem 2 shows that in order to combine monotonicity with respect for ballot rankings, an election must pay attention to the plurality ranking BCA: B must win unless and . If α = β = γ = 1/3, a 3-way tie is declared (and some tie-break may be invoked). 
Conditional
winner is not challenged, we obtain a similar famliy of two-seat elections, but in 3-candidate standard two-seat STV, the plurality winner will be elected to first seat without a runoff.
The vector contains the relative numbers of top-ranks. In figure 5 we interpret them as barycentric coordinates, and represent as a point in the standard simplex (Saari, 1994, p.32) . The Plurality winner always wins with more than 1/2 of the top-ranks, and also with more than 1/3 of the top-ranks unless another candidate also have 1/3 or more of the top-ranks.
If is in one of the rhombic boxes there is an instant runoff for first or second place. There is an instant runoff for second place if and only if number 2 in top-ranks is closer to number 3 than to number 1. The transition from profile (i) moves X slightly down and Y slightly up in the count of top-ranks. If the runoffs in (i) and (ii) are for the same place, they are between the same two candidates, but X will be weaker in (ii) than in (i), and therefore cannot be helped by the strategic attempt. The only possibility to help X would be to make a switch between runoff for first and runoff for second place. That cannot happen in columns 2 and 5. A runoff with X and Y for first place may appear in column 1 or disappear in column 6; in neither case can it help X. A runoff with X and Y for second place may appear in column 3 or disappear in column 4; in neither case can it help X. The same argument works with equal number of topranks for number 1 and 2 or for number 2 and 3. 
Plurality vs Condorcet
Example 8 Two 3-candidate profiles are shown in figure 7:
(|ABC|, |ACB|, |CAB|, |CBA|, |BCA|, |BAC|) = (10, 14, 27, 10, 12, 27);
(|XYZ|, |XZY|, |ZXY|, |ZYX|, |YZX|, |YXZ|) = (22, 18, 03, 25, 27, 05) .
Figure 7 A is Condorcet winner and plurality loser, so by theorem 3 no candidate can win if the election method is monotonic, respects ballot rankings and does not permit strategy 1. X is plurality winner and Condorcet loser; {Y,Z} is a "solid coalition" in the sense that
>50% of the voters rank X last.
For both profiles a spatial model in the shape of a candidate triangle fits well. Since the tiny triangle formed by the chords does not cover the circle center, there is no Condorcet cycle.
The first profile has plurality ranking BCA and Condorcet ranking ACB. Moreover, A is antiplurality winner, i.e. has the smallest number of bottom-ranks, and may be seen as the natural compromise candidate between the wing candidates B and C. However, both standard and conditional IRV eliminate A and after a runoff for first place give ranking C P B I A when there is no need to separate nonelected candidates. Standard 2-seat STV gives first seat to B without runoff and final ranking B P C P A, while conditional STV eliminates A and lets the Apreferrers influence the final ranking, C P B P A. If the two seats have equal status, both 2-seat elections may be modified to give B I C P A. The second profile has plurality ranking XYZ and Condorcet ranking YZX. A "solid coalition" of 52 voters prefers both Y and Z over X. Standard IRV eliminates Z and picks Y after runoff with X; it lets the solid majority win silently with sincere voting. Neither Y nor Z have 1/3 of the top-ranks, thus conditional IRV picks X without instant runoff. This possibility, however,
gives the solid majority an incentive either to use strategy 1 or to break out of our 3-candidate model and promote a common candidate. Standard 2-seat STV gives first seat to X and second seat to Y; conditional STV eliminates Z and then gives Y the first and X the second seat.
The Condorcet relation ranks the candidates according to distance from the center. As long as the poltical reality shows profiles that are well described by our spatial model, it is likely that the circle center also corresponds to a political center in reality and in public perception. Each candidate has an incentive to appear to be located closer to the center than other candidates. This candidates have to balance two incentives. They need good primary support, which they will not obtain by crowding into the political center, and they also need subsidiary support from the center voters.
n-candidate elections, n>3
Consider all n-candidate elections, n>3, that accept all linear ballot rankings, produce a reflexive, complete and transitive social relation R, are neutral and monotonic, and respect ballot rankings. These methods all have a weak Pareto property:
Lemma 3 Neutrality and monotonicity imply that if A P i B for all i, then A R B. On the other hand, by monotonicity, the social ranking B P A is preserved.
Theorem 5 Consider an n-candidate election method, n 3, which allows all linear ballot rankings, produces a reflexive, complete and transitive social relation, is anonymous, neutral, and monotonic, and respects ballot rankings. Then some profiles allow strategy 1-or the method fails to produce a single winner whenever the Condorcet winner is last in top-ranks.
Proof: Consider profiles where 3 candidates A, B, and C are ranked above all other candidates in all ballot rankings. By lemma 3, A, B, and C are at least equal to all others in the social preference relation. By respect for ballot rankings, the restriction of R to {A, B, C} depends only on the restriction of each R i to {A, B, C}. The conclusion follows from theorem 3.
This is a result of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type (Gibbard 1973 , Satterthwaite 1975 . With the additional assumptions of anonymity and neutrality, there is a more specific conclusion than in the original theorem: In a reasonably decisive election method, strategy 1, known from plurality elections, cannot be completely avoided without the more obnoxious strategies 2 or 3 associated with disrespect for ballot rankings or nonmonotonicity becoming available at certain profiles.
The very possibility of successful strategy 1 will occasionally create an unpleasant pressure on some voters to vote against their political conscience. That pressure is often regarded as the main objection to plurality elections. One purpose of all preferential election methods is to reduce this pressure by letting the voters' subsequent rankings influence the social preference.
Obviously, a plurality election is monotonic and respects ballot rankings. Can another monotonic election method that respects ballot rankings be more lenient with the voters?
Conditional IRV for n=3 may be generalized:
Conditional IRV for n>3 candidates Let N(X i ) be the number of top-ranks for candidate X i and order the candidates accordingly: N(X 1 ) N(X 2 ) ... N(X n ).
Assume N(X 1 ) N(X 3 ) (otherwise some tie.break is needed). If 2N(X 2 ) N(X 1 )+N(X 3 ), then have an instant runoff between X 1 and X 2 ; otherwise let X 1 win without a challenge.
In conditional IRV only the plurality winner X 1 could have a reason to attempt strategy 3, with the idea to avoid runoff against X 2 by giving some top-ranks to a third candidate X i . But it is easily checked that this would be too costly: if X 1 raises X i above X 2 then X 1 drops below second place.
On the other hand, if 2N(X 2 ) < N(X 1 )+N(X 3 ), it is easy to construct a profile where X 1 loses a runoff with X 2 but can obtain and win a runoff against X 3 .
Example 9 4 On the choice of election method Sen (1999b) wrote "A country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather it has to become fit through democracy". Democratic ideas must be as ancient as civilization itself, and democracy develops together with a cultural framework that promotes participation through openness, access to information, fora for discussion, and tolerance for deviating opinions.
Elections, and a widely accepted way to interpret them are central parts of that framework.
Vox populi, vox dei (?)
Out of its context, Alcuin's oft quoted phrase, vox populi. vox dei, gives the false impression of coming from a medieval democrat. In 800, Alcuin actually wrote to Charlemagne, Nec audiendi sunt qui solent dicere vox populi, vox dei; cum tumultus vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit (Do not listen to those who would say that the voice of the people is the voice of God, for the voice of the mob is close to madness).
The idea of elections that aggregate individual opinions across the entire society in order to reach a social choice is not likely to be found in the power circles of the medieval world.
However, in Ramon Llull we find the thought that in a suitable context, a suitably restricted ecclesiastical electorate suitably prepared for its task, might find the divine truth. In Artificum electiones personarum, assumed to be written before 1283 (Hägele and Pukelsheim not, may it help us to listen and make some sense out of the many voces it accepts as input?
Interest or judgment; decision or welfare assessment
Social choice theory is still a joint enterprise, common to political science and economics. Is it over-ambitious to cover formal elections and welfare economics with a common theory? Sen Arrow's theorem is about multivariate maps of relations and applies to both the W-side and the D-side. Strategies 1, 2, and 3 are linked to violations of the IIA-axiom, and therefore also belong to both sides. It looks like the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has caused more concern on the D-side than the W-side, perhaps in part because the simpler mathematical structure of formal elections makes it easier to see the problems and to get at them.
Social choice may be made through a market mechanism or through a formal aggregation of individual preferences, as in an election or an SWF. In both cases the interface with the field of ethics is an arena of persistent debate. Examples from the same period are (Sen 1979 ) and the philosophical skirmish that followed (Ng 1981 , Sen 1981 ); Llull's exhortation to voters and candidates alike should also be listened to, as a counterpoint across categories and time.
Sincere or strategic voting
The Strategy 3 is typical of the STV family. It is connected with eliminations in the tally process. It can hardly be exploited in real elections, but it will be upsetting when, on rare occasions, it will be found after an IRV-election that a voter group, who sincerely changed to ABC from BAC, caused C to win instead of A.
However, there are strong arguments in favor of the STV/IRV. With their stepwise tally process, where only the current top-ranked candidate in each ballot is considered, some versions of IRV and STV get rid of strategy 2, which is an important strategic possibility in most matrix elections and Condorcet methods. In many matrix elections, a profile like figure 1 is an incentive to mutually destructive use of strategy 2.
A single-seat preferential election method subdivides a profile space of high dimension into territories, one territory of victory for each candidate, with possible ties at the border. Strategy 2 can then be seen as a step crossing a border although we should expect the step to be parallell to the border. Strategy 3 means crossing a border from, say, the A-territory into the B-territory, although the direction of the step lets us expect that any crossing would be from the B-territory to the A-territory. Strategies 1, 2, and 3 may be said to cross borders in a logical, an illogical, and an antilogical direction, respectively.
Presentations of preferential election methods aimed at voters who are used to plurality elections often start by criticizing the plurality voting for producing an obviously "wrong"
winner, as in the second profile in figure 7 . X is clear plurality winner although a "solid coalition" of 52% of the electorate rank X last, while Y and Z are very close to each other in the political landscape. However, if the supporters of Y and Z will not cooperate towards a common goal, at least by means of strategy 1, then the technical term "solid coalition" is politically inappropriate, and it is not quite fair to blame an election method if X wins. It is not at all clear that X is the "wrong" social choice in the second profile of figure 7.
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For any election method, there will be profiles where some voters find that the choice between expressional and instrumental voting is far from obvious. A conveniens dispositio cordis may mean a willingness to compromise. That is important in many walks of life. As the Jenkins commission remarked, why should an election be an exception? It may also mean a willingness to stand up for a minor candidate, be counted, and accept the result.
Voting methods and the political landscape
Duverger's law is the prime example of an election method (plurality election, often called "first-past-the post") being seen as shaping the political landscape, but all election methods should bee considered from that point of view. Preferential metods are used both in elections where candidates are running without party nomination and in elections with parties as political intermediaries. To the extent that small parties survive with a preferential election method in single-seat constituencies because of the negotiation power carried by their subsidiary votes, some of the political process may also be moved from hidden intra-party struggle (Caillaud and 18. Although a candidate triangle attached to a pictogram reflects an average perception of the political landscape among the voters, one should take care and not overstretch the analogy. In particular, when a spatial model is fitted, the candidate triangle is unique only up to homothetic transformations centered on the chords' intersection point. Tirole, 2002) to open inter-party communication.
What would be the effect of the various matrix elections and Condorcet methods? To an unknown degree, the urge to use strategy 2 will complicate the issue; the strength of this urge varies a lot with the particular election method. Perhaps the Condorcet method which resolves cycles by means of the method in theorem 1 (the candidate who defeats the plurality winner in a one-to-one contest wins in a Condorcet cycle of length 3) deserves special attention. However, if use of strategy 2 will be sufficiently limited, these methods are likely to favor the political center to a very high degree. Such a political compromise may be fine when the electorate is polarized, e.g. through ethnical division (Reilly 2002a) . In other circumstances one may be concerned about a lack of diversity, e.g. if a political assembly consists of local Condorcet winners: Will a driving force, directed differently than the one behind Duverger's law, then contribute to shape a political landscape where only center candidates are noticed?
In terms of the final seat distribution in an assembly, the IRV elections are closer to plurality elections than Condorcet methods are. Conditional IRV, as described above, come closer than standard IRV, and it avoids both of the obnoxious strategies 2 and 3. It puts pressure on more voters to resort to strategy 1, particularly if the condition for an instant runoff may be not fulfilled, but it may still be much more favorable for smaller parties than a plurality election. An impression of how standard and conditional IRV might work in a real election may be obtained barycentric plot incorporates the results of strategy 1 that actually took place.
Since a compromise candidate may well be eliminated before a large potential supply of subsidiary votes has arrived, a major candidate must combine wide acceptance with enthusiastic support. Will IRV or conditional IRV for that reason tend to recruit better candidates for leadership than Condorcet methods will do?
